CBEES Advanced Seminars · 11 May · Chapter Presentation

Bottom-up Mobilisation
in Consolidated Autocracy

Individual and collective voices of the 2020 Belarusian protests.

Speaker
Alesia Rudnik
with S. Bedford, E. Bindman, T. Chulitskaya · Palgrave (2025)
01 · Context

Belarus, summer 2020

The book

Bottom-up mobilisation in consolidated autocracy

Forthcoming, Palgrave 2025.

Co-authored with Sofie Bedford, Eleanor Bindman and Tatsiana Chulitskaya. Today’s presentation focuses on Chapters V–VI, with passages co-written with Chulitskaya.

Empirical base
98
interviews

with protest leaders and participants — collected by Bindman, Chulitskaya & Rudnik across two projects.

In numbers

79%
internet penetration (Jan 2020)
>100k
signatures on the WRW flag petition
~10%
of population registered with Holas
~1,500
political prisoners recognised by Viasna (2024)

The 2020 protests followed an electoral campaign of unprecedented scale, rapid digital coordination, and one of the most violent crackdowns in the country’s history.

Source: DataReportal 2020/2021; Greene 2022; Lawtrend; Viasna 2024; Voice 2020.

02 · Theory

Resource mobilisation — a starting point

McCarthy & Zald (1977)

Movements depend on the strategic use of resources — funding, skills, technologies, networks.

McAdam, McCarthy & Zald (1996)

Mobilising structures include both formal organisations and informal micro-structures: family, friends, voluntary ties.

Opp (2009, p.139)

Resources = goods (anything with utility) which actors can control: money, media access, sympathisers, rooms, rights, knowledge, skills.

The argument

The 2020 Belarusian protests were underpinned by a dense set of non-technological resources that predated and structured the effective use of digital tools.

Together, these constituted a social infrastructure that enabled rapid mobilisation, resilience under repression, and large-scale coordination in the absence of formal political opportunities.

03 · Non-tech resources

Five layers of social infrastructure

1
Informal networks
Family, friends, neighbours, professional ties
2
Civic initiatives
Holas · Honest People · Zubr · ByCovid
3
Financial resources
Crowdfunding, private donations, mutual aid
4
Media capital
Independent outlets, PR experience, audiences
5
Knowledge & skills
IT expertise, security thinking, data literacy

Source: Opp (2009); McAdam, McCarthy & Zald (1996)

03.1 · Informal networks

Informal networks

Family, friendship, neighbourhood and professional ties provided trust, labour and coordination capacities that no platform can produce.

White ribbons. District chats. Colleagues at the same firm. Verification done by hand by fifty volunteers — because reputation, not code, was the guarantee.

We gathered around fifty volunteers, almost fifty. These were students who, again, were all verified, and who had to literally go through everything by hand and recheck all the materials that were coming to us.
Interview 26
These were all neighbours. They decided themselves. And then, very naturally, a group of people formed who were responsible for controlling the area, and they walked around, they figured out among themselves where they would go and at what time.
Interview 8
Why were there so many IT people? These are people of a completely different formation, young people who grew up in society, who did not see the Soviet system, who travelled the world… Digital technologies do not bring something entirely new, but they accelerate tendencies that already existed.
Interview B1
03.2 · Civic initiatives

Civic initiatives

Initiative
Honest People
Administration, promotion, observer work
Initiative
Zubr
Reporting electoral violations
Initiative
Holas
Receiving ballots, dedup, counting, per-station data

Continuity treated as a collective asset — every manager had a duplicate, ready to step in if detained. — Interviews 27, 36

03.3 – 03.5 · Money · Media · Skills

What else they could control

Money

Crowdfunding via Molamola, BySol, Kickstarter. Private donations from Belarusian businesses. Neighbourhood Telegram chats covering fines for detained residents.

Independence from state-controlled funding — embedded in trust between organisers, donors and local communities.

Media

Independent media as an autonomous structural element of Belarusian politics (Greene 2022). TUT.by reached 96% of independent-media consumers and 52% of state-media consumers.

Media capital lived in people, not platforms — PR professionals, event organisers, large-business veterans on activist boards.

Skills

IT and data engineering: chatbots, neural-network vote verification, secure-channel design. Legal & human-rights expertise translated into ‘what to do if detained’ cards.

Knowledge circulated peer-to-peer under repression — “people simply started downloading Psiphon and passing it to each other.” (Interview 14)

04 · Tech as resource

Why technology became an ally in 2020

01
A digitalised society
79% internet use (Jan 2020) → 82% (Jan 2021). 122% mobile connections — more than one phone per person. Independent media existed only online.
02
Platforms people already used
Babaryka & Tsapkala on YouTube/Telegram/Instagram. Tsikhanouski leveraged his existing YouTube vlog. “Not unique technologies — we just selected the right ones.”
03
A live rehearsal — ByCovid
Spring 2020: dozens of coordinators, hundreds of volunteers, thousands of citizens delivering supplies to hospitals. The civic infrastructure was tested before August.
04
A clear warning shot
4–5 weeks before election day: peer-to-peer messages told everyone to install VPN and Telegram, anticipating the internet shutdown.

Central digital platforms

Telegram
Mobilisation, news, chatbots, neighbourhood chats. The “safe” channel after the shutdown.
YouTube
Long-form: candidate interviews, Tsikhanouski’s vlog, Babaryka live streams (one video → ~500k views).
Instagram
Personal political expression; the on-ramp to Honest People & Holas.
Viber
Daily comms turned into a forum. Narodny Opros polling — Tsikhanouskaya at 75–79%.
YouTube/TUT.by
Editorial interviews making opposition figures legible to a mass audience.
Tinder
When everything else was blocked, swiping became coordination.
From the interviews

When the network goes down,
improvisation goes up.

“The second trick we figured out was that when all the social networks started getting blocked, Tinder still worked. The important thing was to match on Tinder so that we could message each other. Sorry, but that’s what we had to do.”
— Interview 5
Telegram

Coordination, not just communication

  • • NEXTA Live: locations, schedules, self-defence guides
  • • Weekly Sunday marches planned through channels (Interview 13)
  • • Real-time police-van locations shaped go/no-go decisions (Int. 37)
  • • Educational ‘what to do if detained’ cards (Int. 18)
  • • Neighbourhood chats reconstituted lost local bonds (U-2)
Holas

Alternative electoral infrastructure

550,000
verified ballot pairs (front + back) processed

Telegram + Viber chatbots → neural-network verification → human review on the ~20% the model couldn’t recognise. Manual equivalent: 1,000+ volunteers.

All of this eventually led us to the idea that we should use Telegram channels that are difficult to track. At that moment, the most reliable were chatbots, because in the case of a chatbot, you do not know where its backend is located, so you do not have a clear point of attack.
Interview 27 — Telegram editor

A small piece of strategic engineering — and a small piece of theory: tools were chosen by what attackers could and could not see.

Chapter VI

Technology as mediator
— and as a space for protest.

Beyond ‘a set of tools’: platforms shape the form of interaction, alter relations between actors, co-construct identities, and expand the geography of a movement.

Source: Della Porta & Diani 2020; Gerbaudo 2012; Sayes 2014; Costanza-Chock 2020.

05 · Tech as mediator

Telegram’s mediation produced more than information. It produced a feeling of momentum — and that feeling itself shaped participation.

  • • Decentralised coordination (broadcast + closed chats + bots)
  • • Reconstituted neighbourhood ties via local chats
  • • Real-time risk assessment as a daily protest practice
  • • Emotional rhythm: quick effect, low verification
“If we talk about NEXTA, it is like a fast carbohydrate. You read it and think, the riot police dropped their shields, we took Pinsk. You have no verifying evidence, nothing, but you get a quick emotion, a quick effect.”
— Interview 23
“People stopped talking to their neighbours, sometimes greeting each other, sometimes forgetting their names, and then suddenly remembering them again — then these district chats appeared, people signed up with the same nicknames they signed up with 15–20 years ago…”
— Interview U-2

Mateo (2022): grassroots Telegram infrastructure carried protest beyond Minsk to smaller cities and towns.

06 · Clicktivism → Hacktivism

George & Leidner’s digital activism hierarchy, applied to Belarus

Three ascending levels of effort and impact — used here as a lens, with two caveats: authoritarian shutdowns reshape the repertoire, and both tools and users can be co-opted.

01SpectatorLow effort · Low impact
Tactics
  • · Clicktivism
  • · Likes & shares
  • · Registering a view
In Belarus, 2020

Forwarding NEXTA posts; mass dissemination of “8 pm, 9 August, polling stations”; likes & views as a measurable metric of opposition support (Interview 7).

02TransitionalMid effort · Mid impact
Tactics
  • · Fundraising
  • · Political consumerism
  • · Surveys & petitions
  • · Bot-mediated submissions
In Belarus, 2020

BySol / Molamola / Kickstarter solidarity funds; neighbours covering each other’s fines; teaching grandparents to vote via Holas; 103,000 signatures on the WRW-flag petition.

03GladiatorialHigh effort · High impact
Tactics
  • · Data activism
  • · Information exposure
  • · Hacktivism
In Belarus, 2020

Holas + Honest People + Zubr electoral infrastructure; mass photo/video archives of repression; Cyberpartisans publishing KGB & police-informant databases.

Source: George & Leidner (2019); applied by the authors.

07 · Co-opting the tool

Co-opting the tool, agency and space of dissent

From negative control to proactive co-optation. Gunitsky (2015): autocracies move from blocking to using digital platforms for regime functions.

Infiltration & duplication
Black Book Belarus infiltrated; state-built duplicates of activist bots (Peramoha); attacks on Belaruski Hajun’s chatbot.
Surveillance through metadata
Telegram IDs and phone numbers used to identify users; people detained for chat subscriptions and old comments.
A repressive legal infrastructure
Weaponised ‘extremist’ and ‘terrorist’ designations (Rudnik, 2024). 1,235+ CSOs shut down; 47 media and 600+ journalists operating in exile (Lawtrend; JXF, 2025).
I moved because some well-wisher posted my information in the Telegram chat “Act according to your conscience”… There was a screenshot of messages I’d written in a former extremist group, formerly called ‘Hrodna 97%.’ It was in August 2020, during the hottest days, that I scribbled something and conveniently forgot about it. They invited me to come to the HUBOP. I thought I had to leave because it was a nightmare. I was already afraid to sleep, afraid to live.
Respondent K-3

The same tools that hosted the infrastructure of dissent became, within months, the primary infrastructure of repression.

Key arguments of the chapter

Beyond a toolbox — what technology actually did

Read alongside Della Porta & Diani (2020), Gerbaudo (2012), Sayes (2014) and Costanza-Chock (2020): platforms in 2020 Belarus were not only resources but mediators — they shaped the form of interaction, the relations between actors, and the geography of the movement.

Argument 01 · Architecture as agency

The combination of broadcast channels, closed group chats and anonymous feedback bots enabled a form of decentralised coordination that no single actor controlled.

Argument 02 · Migration to Telegram

As the August 2020 election approached, opposition figures, media and ordinary users migrated to Telegram, ensuring continuity of communication despite expected state-imposed disruptions.

Argument 03 · Security drove platform choice

Channels were chosen not by reach but by what attackers could not see: chatbots became central precisely because their backends were opaque to the regime (Interview 27).

Argument 04 · Reconstitution of local ties

District Telegram groups rebuilt neighbourhood bonds that years of distrust had eroded — and carried protest beyond Minsk into smaller towns (Mateo, 2022).

Argument 05 · Speed produces emotion

The temporal grammar of the platform — quick effect, low verification — generated a feeling of momentum that was, in itself, mobilising.

Argument 06 · The agency stayed offline

Technology expanded the ecosystem of mobilisation, but the agency of the movement resided in the social solidarities and civic dispositions participants brought to it.

People trusted that nothing would happen to them, that if they sent something in, it would not come back to harm them. And Telegram channels used this like a normal media platform — they published everything people sent them.
Interview 20
We encouraged people to join the chatbot, saying we needed 140,000 people… more than 27,000 joined. But the regime didn’t stop there. They honed their Telegram skills — identifying people, recording them, doing it demonstratively on camera, so others would be scared.
Interview C-1
The pivot

The same platforms that hosted the digital infrastructure of dissent became, within months, the primary infrastructure of the regime’s surveillance and propaganda networks.

What began as a space of relative freedom for opposition actors became a contested space in which the state sought to reassert informational dominance.

Source: Rudnik 2024; Roberts 2018; Feldstein 2021; Center for New Ideas 2025.

Synthesis

Five takeaways for mobilisation theory in autocracies

01

Digital tools amplify what social infrastructure has already built; they rarely create it.

02

Trust is the most important non-material resource — and it travels through people, not platforms.

03

Strategic security thinking shapes platform choice (chatbots, VPN, neighbourhood chats).

04

George & Leidner’s hierarchy needs an authoritarian extension: shutdowns, criminalisation, co-optation.

05

The medium of mobilisation can become, almost overnight, the medium of repression.

08 · Discussion

Open questions for the chapter.

?

How can classic resource mobilisation theory be extended to capture the role of trust under repression?

?

Where does ‘decentralised coordination’ end and ‘leaderless vulnerability’ begin?

?

Should the George & Leidner hierarchy be redrawn entirely for closed regimes — or only annotated?

?

How do we conceptualise platforms that function simultaneously as mediator, weapon, and archive?

?

What does ‘success’ mean for a movement whose digital traces become evidence against its participants?

References

Selected works cited

Bennett, W. L. & Segerberg, A. (2012). The logic of connective action. Information, Communication & Society, 15(5).

Castells, M. (2015). Networks of Outrage and Hope. Polity.

Costanza-Chock, S. (2020). Design Justice. MIT Press.

Della Porta, D. & Diani, M. (2020). Social Movements: An Introduction. Wiley.

Earl, J. et al. (2022). The digital repression of social movements. Annual Review of Sociology.

Feldstein, S. (2021). The Rise of Digital Repression. OUP.

George, J. J. & Leidner, D. E. (2019). From clicktivism to hacktivism. Information & Organization.

Gerbaudo, P. (2012). Tweets and the Streets. Pluto.

Greene, S. (2022). Media polarization and protest in Belarus.

Gunitsky, S. (2015). Corrupting the cyber-commons. Perspectives on Politics.

Hierasimenka, A. et al. (2020). Telegram and Belarusian protest mobilisation.

Mateo, E. (2022). All of Belarus has come out onto the streets. Post-Soviet Affairs.

McAdam, D., McCarthy, J. D. & Zald, M. N. (1996). Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements. CUP.

McCarthy, J. D. & Zald, M. N. (1977). Resource mobilization and social movements. AJS.

Morozov, E. (2011). The Net Delusion. PublicAffairs.

Opp, K.-D. (2009). Theories of Political Protest and Social Movements. Routledge.

Roberts, M. E. (2018). Censored. Princeton.

Rudnik, A. (2024); Rudnik, A. (2025). Forthcoming, Palgrave.

Rudnik, A. & Rönnblom, M. (2024). Telegram in the Belarusian protest.

Sayes, E. (2014). Actor–Network Theory and methodology. Social Studies of Science.

Wijermars, M. & Lokot, T. (2022). Is Telegram a ‘harbinger of freedom’? Post-Soviet Affairs.

DataReportal (2020, 2021); Voice (2020); Viasna (2024); JXF (2025); Lawtrend; Center for New Ideas (2025).

Thank you.

I welcome any comments that strengthen the conceptual base — especially where classic mobilisation theory falls short.

Alesia Rudnikalesia.rudnik@sh.seCBEES, Södertörn University